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“HISTORIC” IN A BAD WAY: HOW THE
TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER ACT
CONTINUES THE AMERICAN TRADITION
OF PROVIDING INADEQUATE
PROTECTION TO AMERICAN INDIAN AND
ALASKA NATIVE RAPE VICTIMS
Jasmine Owens*
I. ONE OF THESE THINGS IS NOT LIKE THE OTHERS
Four different men, Earl Pratt of Massachusetts, Wendell Lee
Strickland of Arkansas, Ronnie Tom of Washington, and Tommy Lee
Johnson of Texas, committed heinous crimes against children.1 Each man
raped a seven-year-old child in his respective state, and each was convicted
and sentenced for his crime.2 Despite general disdain for egregious crimes
such as rape (whether of man, woman, or child), our justice system treats
one of these men very differently from the rest. Pratt received a twentyfive-to-thirty-year sentence in Massachusetts,3 Johnson received twenty
years in Texas,4 and Strickland received an eighteen-year sentence in
*
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1
See Strickland v. State, No. CACR09-1286, 2010 WL 3566725 (Ark. Ct. App. Sept. 15,
2010); Kerry Drennan, Court Convicts Repeat Drunken Driver, Sentences Rapist, LUBBOCK
AVALANCHE-J., Feb. 4, 2003, at A8; Michael Riley, Promises, Justice Broken: A
Dysfunctional System Lets Serious Reservation Crimes Go Unpunished and Puts Indians at
Risk, DENVER POST, Nov. 11, 2007, at 1A, available at http://www.denverpost.com/
ci_7429560; Man Sentenced for Raping 7-Year-Old: Girl Raped in 2006, BOS. CHANNEL
(July 22, 2009), http://www.thebostonchannel.com/r/20141357/detail.html.
2
See sources cited supra note 1.
3
Man Sentenced for Raping 7-Year-Old: Girl Raped in 2006, supra note 1.
4
Drennan, supra note 1.
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Arkansas.5 But Ronnie Tom served less than two years in a Colville Indian
jail in the state of Washington because the Assistant United States Attorney
in Spokane, Washington, declined to prosecute him, and federal laws
prohibited the tribe from exacting a greater sentence.6
On a winter night in 2003, Ronnie Tom attempted to rape his live-in
girlfriend’s twelve-year-old sister.7 The girl managed to escape Tom’s
attack, but he redirected his assault to his girlfriend’s seven-year-old
daughter.8 Unfortunately, Tom succeeded in his vicious crime.9 Although
an “expert forensics interviewer found the [seven-year-old’s] testimony
recounting the rape clear and credible,” Tom was never charged with a
felony.10 Tom is now living with his girlfriend and their young daughter,11
despite a sexual-predator profile warning that Tom “should never be
allowed to be alone with children, including his own, or live ‘near places
designed for children, such as schools, playgrounds (or) swimming
pools.’”12
Why is it that Tom is home with his child, free to offend again, while
others who committed similar crimes have been locked away for decades?
Tom was not proven to be less culpable for his crime than his fellow
offenders; there was no determination of insufficient evidence, nor was
there any prosecutorial or police misconduct causing the case to be
dismissed on a technicality. The differences between Tom and the other
convicted child rapists are race and location. Because Tom is a Colville
Indian13 who committed his crime on the Colville Indian reservation in

5

Strickland, 2010 WL 3566725, at *1.
Riley, supra note 1.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
This is particularly disturbing considering that “[s]ex offenders who commit acts of
sexual violence against children have one of the highest rates of recidivism among all
criminals . . . .” Krista L. Blaisdell, Note, Protecting the Playgrounds of the Twenty-First
Century: Analyzing Computer and Internet Restrictions for Internet Sex Offenders, 43 VAL.
U. L. REV. 1155, 1192 (2009) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
CRIMINAL OFFENDER STATISTICS, SUMMARY FINDINGS).
12
Riley, supra note 1.
13
Scholars use varied terms to refer to the United States’ indigenous people. Legal
scholarship often refers to “Indians” while other fields use the term “Native Americans.”
Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul: Exploring the Intersection of Rape Law Reform and
Federal Indian Law, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455, 455 n.2 (2005); see also STEPHEN
CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICAL RESURGENCE (1988).
This Article will use the terms interchangeably.
6
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eastern Washington, his case falls under federal jurisdiction.14 In Tom’s
case the Assistant United States Attorney (located 150 miles away in
Spokane, Washington) declined to prosecute, as they do in 65% of cases
coming from Indian Country.15 The Colville Tribal Court was constrained
by federal legislation capping sentences delivered by tribal courts to one
year of incarceration per crime, a $5,000 fine, or both.16 The tribe charged
and convicted Tom for his crime and a separate incident involving Tom’s
girlfriend’s twelve-year-old sister, resulting in less than two years of
incarceration in tribal jail, the maximum penalty the tribe could impose.17
Unfortunately, the story of Ronnie Tom is an all-too-common reality
for American Indian and Alaska Native people living in the United States’
domestic dependent nations (Indian Country). American Indian and Alaska
Native people suffer from a disproportionately high rate of rape and sexual
assault.18

14

See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2006) (giving the federal government exclusive jurisdiction
over “[a]ny Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other
person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming,
a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a
dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury . . . , an assault against an
individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or neglect, arson,
burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country”).
Note that the statute was amended in 1986, substituting “a felony under chapter 109A” for
“rape, involuntary sodomy, carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife, who has not
attained the age of sixteen years, assault with intent to commit rape.” Sexual Abuse Act of
1986, Pub. L. 99-654, § 3(a)(5), 100 Stat. 3660, 3663.
15
Riley, supra note 1.
16
See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B) (2006). Originally
limiting tribal courts to sentences of six months or fines of $500, or both, the Indian Civil
Rights Act (ICRA) was amended in 1986 to allow harsher penalties. See Indian Alcohol and
Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 4217, 100
Stat. 3207-146 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1994)) (“No Indian tribe in
exercising powers of self-government shall . . . impose for conviction of any one offense any
penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of one year and a fine of $5,000,
or both . . . .” (footnote omitted)). Section 1302 was further amended in 2010 to allow
punishment of up to three years or $15,000 if the crime was punishable by more than one
year were it prosecuted federally. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7) (Supp. IV 2011).
17
Riley, supra note 1. The almost-two-year sentence was possible because Tom was
charged with misdemeanors stemming from the rape of the seven-year-old and another
substantive crime involving a previous incident with the twelve-year-old. If Tom had been
charged with one substantive crime, e.g., just charges stemming from the rape of the sevenyear-old, the tribal court would have lacked authority to sentence Tom to more than one year
incarceration, a $5,000 fine, or both. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1994); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153 (2006) (precluding tribal courts from having jurisdiction over several enumerated
crimes, including rape).
18
AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN
FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 2 (2007).
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Data gathered by the US Department of Justice indicates that Native American and
Alaska Native women are more than 2.5 times more likely to be raped or sexually
assaulted than women in the USA in general . . . . [M]ore than one in three [Native
American and Alaska Native women] will be raped during their lifetime; the
19
comparable figure for the USA as a whole is less than one in five.

And while the assaults on American Indian and Alaska Native women are
more violent than rapes suffered by the general population,20 their rapes
often go unprosecuted.21 A complex concurrent jurisdictional system and
mixed messages about state, federal, and tribal responsibilities lessen
accountability for all law enforcement agencies involved and result in a lack
of justice for victims.
The latest enlargement of the jurisdictional system adds little more
than another piece of legislation to the jurisdictional maze. On July 29,
2010, President Barack Obama signed the Tribal Law and Order Act of
2010 (the Act), the federal government’s solution to the problems faced by
American Indian and Alaska Native people.22 The legislation, lauded as
“historic”23 and “groundbreaking,”24 does not do enough to protect women
who have suffered rape and sexual violence. Despite the good press and
excitement surrounding the new legislation, it fails to accomplish its stated
purpose: “to reduce the prevalence of violent crime in Indian country and to
combat sexual and domestic violence against American Indian and Alaska
Native women . . . .”25 The amendment does not recognize tribal authority
to prosecute rape and other serious felonies and continues to restrict tribal
courts’ authority to adequately punish tribal members.
This Comment explains the problems with the current criminal justice
system governing American Indian and Alaska Native people and offers a
19

Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111211, § 202(a)(5)(A), 124 Stat. 2261, 2262 (recognizing that “domestic and sexual violence
against American Indian and Alaska Native women has reached epidemic proportions”).
20
See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 5 (“Fifty per cent of American Indian and
Alaska Native women reported that they suffered physical injuries in addition to the rape; the
comparable figure for women in general in the USA is 30 per cent.” (footnote omitted)).
21
See id. at 9.
22
Gale Courey Toensing, Obama Signs ‘Historic’ Tribal Law and Order Act, INDIAN
COUNTRY
TODAY
MEDIA
NETWORK
(July
30,
2010),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2010/07/30/obama-signs-%e2%80%98historic
%e2%80%99-tribal-law-and-order-act-57502. The Tribal Law and Order Act amended An
Act to Protect Indian Arts and Crafts Through the Improvement of Applicable Criminal
Proceeding, and for Other Purposes.
23
Id.
24
Larry Cox, President Obama Signs Tribal Law and Order Act, HUM. RTS. NOW—
AMNESTY INT’L USA BLOG (Aug. 2, 2010), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/women/presidentobama-signs-tribal-law-and-order-act.
25
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, § 202(b)(4).
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critique of and suggestions for the Tribal Law and Order Act. Specifically,
this Comment argues that, to better protect Native American women from
rape and sexual violence and to achieve the policy goal of healing past
relations with American Indians and Alaska Natives, Congress should
explicitly recognize concurrent jurisdiction between federal and tribal
authorities to prosecute major crimes and remove restrictions on tribal
authorities’ ability to punish serious crimes such as rape.
This Comment starts with an overview of the problem of sexual
violence in Indian Country to provide a clear picture of the unique problems
facing American Indian and Alaska Native rape victims, and an
understanding of why modifications to the new legislation are necessary.
Part II.A explains the extent of the violence, II.B describes criminal
jurisdiction over Indian Country, and 0 illustrates problems of
implementation of the current system. This Comment then takes an indepth look at the Tribal Law and Order Act; Part III.A describes how the
Act changes tribal jurisdiction and Part III.B details the practical effect of
those changes. Part IV considers the Tribal Law and Order Act’s viability
as a solution to the problems discussed in Part II. Finally, Part V suggests
modifications that would make the legislation more effective in combating
sexual violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women.
II. THE PROBLEM
Ronnie Tom’s story is far from unusual. This Part details the sexual
violence epidemic affecting Indian Country, the difficulty in determining
which jurisdiction has authority to prosecute and investigate incidents of
rape and sexual violence, and the practical problems arising out of the
existing jurisdictional system that the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010
seeks to redress.
A. RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN INDIAN COUNTRY

Rape and sexual violence in Indian Country have reached epidemic
levels. Data gathered by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ)
suggests that American Indian and Alaska Native women are over 2.5 times
more likely to be raped or sexually assaulted than other women living in the
United States.26 A DOJ study looking at violence against all American
women suggested that more than one in three American Indian and Alaska
Native women will be raped during their lifetimes, compared to less than

26

STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, AMERICAN
INDIANS AND CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992–2002, at 5 (2004), available at
http://www.justice.gov/otj/pdf/american_indians_and_crime.pdf.
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one in five women in the general population.27 DOJ reports that at least
86% of the reported cases of rape or sexual assault against American Indian
and Alaska Native women are committed by non-Native men.28 A quarter
of reported sexual violence towards these women is suffered at the hands of
an intimate partner, while 41% of rapes are committed by strangers.29
These numbers paint a dire picture. Even more distressing is that some
anti-rape and human rights organizations think the numbers are a gross
underestimation of the amount of rape and sexual violence plaguing Indian
Country.30
The sheer magnitude of the rape and sexual violence problem is itself
shocking, but worse still is the brutality of the rapes suffered by American
Indian and Alaska Native women.
Rape is always an act of violence, but there is evidence to suggest that sexual violence
against American Indian and Alaska Native women involves a higher level of
additional physical violence. Fifty per cent of American Indian and Alaska Native
women reported that they suffered physical injuries in addition to the rape; the
31
comparable figure for women in general in the USA is 30 per cent.

In addition, the identity of those who rape American Indian and Alaska
Native women makes the already brutal act take on tragic significance.
While the majority of rapes in the United States are intraracial (white
women are mostly raped by white men, black women are mostly raped by
black men, etc.),32 rapes of American Indians and Alaska Natives are
typically committed by non-Native outsiders.33 Some have interpreted the
rapes as a continuation of America’s colonizing relationship with Native
American and Alaska Native people.34
27

PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF
JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 22 (2000) (reporting the figure as 34.1%).
28
AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 4.
29
PERRY, supra note 26, at 8; see also AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 6 (noting the
extent of sexual violence at the hands of male acquaintances, boyfriends, or husbands and
highlighting the problems women face with law enforcement officials who do not recognize
sexual violence between intimate partners as a crime).
30
See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 2 (“Amnesty International’s interviews
with survivors, activists and support workers across the USA suggest that available statistics
greatly underestimate the severity of the problem.”).
31
AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 5 (citing Ronet Bachman, The Epidemiology of
Rape and Sexual Assaults Against American Indian Women: An Analysis of NCVS Data,
Presentation to Federal and Tribal Working Group on Sexual Assault Against Native
American Women (Sept. 29, 2003), referenced in Deer, supra note 13, at 457).
32
Deer, supra note 13, at 457.
33
See supra text accompanying note 28.
34
Deer, supra note 13, at 459 (“[W]hen speaking with Native American women who
have survived rape, it is often difficult for them to separate the more immediate experience
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American Indian and Alaska Native women are more likely to be
raped and brutalized during their rapes, and they arguably suffer additional
mental anguish stemming from the historical significance of the ongoing
rape and colonization of their tribes. Additionally, the sexual assault and
rape of American Indian and Alaska Native women is much more likely to
be ignored.35 As President Obama stated at a conference with tribal leaders,
“[t]he shocking and contemptible fact that one in three Native American
women will be raped in their lifetimes is an assault on our national
conscience that we can no longer ignore.”36
B. THE JURISDICTIONAL MAZE

Despite the president’s statement, a complicated jurisdictional maze of
federal legislation and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence frustrates
fulfillment of that promise. The mix of federal, state, and tribal authorities
responsible for policing and prosecuting incidents occurring in Indian
Country and by or against American Indian and Alaska Native residents has
been described by Congress as a “complicated jurisdictional scheme.” 37
Indian reservations are considered domestic dependent nations for which
the United States “has distinct legal, treaty, and trust obligations to provide
for the public safety.”38 The federal government attempted to fulfill these
obligations by asserting more control over criminal investigations and

of their assault from the larger experience that their people have experienced through forced
removal, displacement, and destruction.”). Consider a passage from the diary of one of
Christopher Columbus’s friends, writing about an encounter with an indigenous woman on
Columbus’s second voyage to the Americas, for an example of the almost immediate
initiation of the rape of Native American women by European men upon their arrival in the
Americas:
When I was in the boat, I captured a very beautiful Carib woman . . . . [H]aving brought her into
my cabin, and she being naked as is their custom, I conceived desire to take my pleasure. I
wanted to put my desire to execution, but she was unwilling for me to do so, and treated me with
her nails in such wise that I would have preferred never to have begun. But seeing this . . . I took
a rope-end and thrashed her well, following which she produced such screaming and wailing as
would cause you not to believe your ears. Finally we reached an agreement such that, I can tell
you, she seemed to have been raised in a veritable school of harlots . . . .

Deer, supra note 13, at 458 (citing Michele de Cuneo, Letter to a Friend, in THE DISCOVERY
OF AMERICA AND OTHER MYTHS 129 (Thomas Christensen & Carol Christensen eds., 1992)).
35
See infra Parts II.B, II.C.
36
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President During the Opening of the Tribal
Nations Conference & Interactive Discussion with Tribal Leaders (Nov. 5, 2009) (transcript
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-during-openingtribal-nations-conference-interactive-discussion-w).
37
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202(a)(4), 124 Stat. 2261,
2262.
38
§ 202(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2262.
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prosecutions involving American Indian and Alaska Native people.39
However, three pieces of legislation and one Supreme Court decision have
curtailed tribal governments’ power to investigate and prosecute criminal
offenses: (1) the Major Crimes Act of 1885,40 (2) Public Law 280 of 1953,41
(3) the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,42 and (4) Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe in 1978.43
The Major Crimes Act of 1885 marked the first indication that the
federal government possessed any authority over crimes occurring in Indian
Country.44 The Act authorized federal jurisdiction over “major crimes.”
These major crimes now include murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
maiming, assault with intent to commit murder, assault, felony child abuse
or neglect, arson, burglary, robbery, and rape, committed by an Indian
against the “person or property of another Indian or other person.”45
The Major Crimes Act is ambiguous on two points. First, it is unclear
whether the Act provides exclusive jurisdiction to the federal government
over the enumerated crimes, or if it provides for concurrent jurisdiction
with tribal courts.46 Second, the definitions of the enumerated crimes are
ambiguous, resulting in substantial litigation aimed at defining them. 47
These ambiguities are confusing to both tribal and federal authorities and,
more importantly, to victims seeking assistance.48
The Major Crimes Act does not explicitly grant exclusive jurisdiction
to the federal government for the enumerated crimes at the expense of the
39

See Deer, supra note 13, at 460.
Ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006)).
41
Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at
§ 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)).
42
Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201–203, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301–1303 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
43
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). For a general discussion of
how the four laws interact, see Deer, supra note 13, at 460–63.
44
Deer, supra note 13, at 460.
45
Major Crimes Act of 1885, ch. 341, § 9.
46
See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that the
Major Crimes Act grants federal courts jurisdiction over the enumerated crimes); United
States v. John, 587 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1979) (same); United States v. Tyndall, 400 F. Supp
949 (D. Neb. 1975) (same).
47
See DeMarrias v. United States, 487 F.2d 19 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that assault with
a dangerous weapon was triable under the Major Crimes Act); United States v. Davis, 429
F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1970) (clarifying that the Major Crimes Act includes the crime of assault
with a dangerous weapon, but not the lesser included offense of simple assault and battery);
Tyndall, 400 F. Supp. 949 (holding that assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury is not
a crime under the Major Crimes Act); United States v. Davis, 148 F. Supp. 478 (D.N.D.
1957) (holding that carnal knowledge did not constitute rape under the Major Crimes Act).
48
See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 8.
40
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tribal court’s own jurisdiction.49 However, courts disagree on whether
jurisdiction over major crimes is exclusively federal or exists concurrently
with tribal sovereigns.50 Some courts interpret the statute to exclude tribal
jurisdiction over American Indian and Alaska Native offenders,51 while
others have held that tribal courts retain concurrent jurisdiction if the crime
is committed in Indian Country by an American Indian or Alaska Native
perpetrator.52
For example, Dan Martin Sam, a member of the Navajo tribe, was
convicted of raping an American Indian on the Navajo reservation; the
federal district court in New Mexico sentenced him to twenty years
imprisonment.53 Sam appealed to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that a language
barrier between Sam and his court-appointed attorney interfered with his
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.54 Sam
sought, among other relief, to have the case transferred to Navajo courts.55
However, the Tenth Circuit held that under the Major Crimes Act,
prosecution of an Indian for rape of another Indian within Indian Country
was a case beyond the jurisdiction of a tribal court.56
In contrast to Sam, the Ninth Circuit recognized concurrent jurisdiction
in Wetsit v. Stafne, when it held that a tribal court had the authority to try
Georgia Leigh Wetsit for stabbing her husband despite Wetsit’s earlier
acquittal in a federal district court case arising from the same incident.57
The court found that tribes retain inherent sovereignty to prosecute Indians
who commit crimes enumerated by the Major Crimes Act.58
49

See also Deer, supra note 13, at 460.
See Felicia v. United States, 495 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir. 1974) (implying that the
Major Crimes Act stripped tribal courts of jurisdiction of crimes enumerated by the Act);
Sam v. United States, 385 F.2d 213, 214 (10th Cir. 1967) (similar). But see Wetsit v. Stafne,
44 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing tribes’ concurrent jurisdiction with the federal
government to prosecute crimes enumerated in the Major Crimes Act). In Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Supreme Court recognized that there is a question of whether
the Major Crimes Act granted the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over enumerated
crimes committed by Indians, but declined to rule on this issue. 435 U.S. 191, 203 n.14
(1978) (“We have no reason to decide today whether jurisdiction under the Major Crimes
Act is exclusive.”).
51
See Felicia, 495 F.2d at 354; Sam, 385 F.2d at 214.
52
See Wetsit, 44 F.3d at 825.
53
Sam, 385 F.2d at 214–15.
54
Id. at 214.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Wetsit, 44 F.3d at 825.
58
Id. That the tribes retain jurisdiction over crimes within the Major Crimes Act is the
conclusion already reached by distinguished authorities on the subject. See, e.g., WILLIAM
C. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 135 (2d ed. 1988) ( “[T]he great majority
50
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Besides the unsettled issue of whether tribes share concurrent
jurisdiction with the federal government over the enumerated crimes, there
has been some confusion as to what those crimes are. For example, in the
limited arena of rape, confusion existed as to whether “rape” as enumerated
in the Major Crimes Act included statutory rape59 and carnal knowledge.60
Through several judicial opinions, “rape” was construed as including only
common law rape, not statutory rape or carnal knowledge.61 Courts
reasoned that Congress adopted a state law definition of rape by subjecting
an Indian who commits rape to the same laws and penalties as any other
person committing the offense within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States; therefore Congress intended to include only acts that
constituted common law rape, not carnal knowledge or statutory rape
(which are not crimes under federal law).62 The same confusion as to what
constitutes a “major crime” under the Act has been litigated regarding
assault,63 battery,64 drug offenses,65 larceny,66 and attempted crimes.67
The Major Crimes Act introduced great uncertainty as to the proper
place to prosecute crimes committed in Indian Country by American Indian

of tribes have for many years exercised jurisdiction over the crime of theft, which duplicates
larceny, a crime rather surprisingly included in the original Major Crimes Act.”).
59
Statutory rape is defined as “[u]nlawful sexual intercourse with a person under the age
of consent (as defined by statute), regardless of whether it is against that person’s will.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1288 (8th ed. 1999).
60
Carnal knowledge is defined as “[s]exual intercourse, esp. with an underage female.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 226 (8th ed. 1999).
61
See Pocatello v. United States, 394 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Rider,
282 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1960); Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1953);
Quagon v. Biddle, 5 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1925); United States v. Red Bear, 250 F. Supp. 633
(D.S.D. 1966); Petition of McCord, 151 F. Supp. 132 (D. Alaska 1957).
62
Rider, 282 F.2d at 478–79; see also id. at 480 (holding that “‘rape’ as used in Section
1153 [does] not encompass the crime of ‘statutory rape’”).
63
See United States v. Tyndall, 400 F. Supp. 949 (D. Neb. 1975) (examining whether
assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury constituted a crime under the Major Crimes
Act).
64
See DeMarrias v. United States, 487 F.2d 19 (8th Cir. 1973) (determining that the
federal courts had jurisdiction over the felony offense of assault with a dangerous weapon,
but lacked jurisdiction to try simple assault and battery).
65
See United States v. Blue, 722 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1983) (examining whether the sale of
drugs in Indian Country was punishable under federal jurisdiction despite its omission from
the list of a major crimes).
66
See United States v. Gilbert, 378 F. Supp. 82 (D.S.D. 1974) (holding that larceny falls
within federal jurisdiction regardless of the monetary value of the good).
67
See United States v. Joe, 452 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1971) (holding that federal
jurisdiction applies only to attempts to commit crimes specifically enumerated by the Major
Crimes Act).
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and Alaska Native people and the precise definition of what crimes were
covered.68
The second piece of legislation to reassign jurisdiction was Public Law
280.69 Enacted in 1953, Public Law 280 further infringes on tribal
authority.70 Public Law 280 transferred federal criminal jurisdiction,
obtained by virtue of the Major Crimes Act discussed above, over Indian
Country in California, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and
Alaska from the federal government to state governments.71 Neither the
affected states (“public law states”) nor the tribes consented to the new
arrangement, which forced public law states to assume the additional
responsibility without receiving any additional resources from the federal
government.72
Finally, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) is the third piece
of federal legislation to constrain tribal jurisdiction. The ICRA required
tribal governments to observe the Bill of Rights to protect tribal members’
constitutional rights. For tribal courts, the ICRA meant providing
procedural and substantive due process, trial by jury, and other
constitutional rights guaranteed in American courts.73 In addition to
imposing the Bill of Rights on tribal governments, the ICRA limited the
punishment that a tribe may impose on criminal defendants.74 Originally,
the ICRA limited punishment to a maximum of six months of incarceration
or a fine of $500, but it was amended in 1986 to increase the maximum
sentence to one year of incarceration, a $5,000 fine, or both.75
The ICRA is controversial because of the numerous ways in which it
restricts tribal sovereignty.76 The Act goes beyond paternalism, as it
68

See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 8 (“The US federal government has created a
complex interrelation between [tribal, state, and federal] jurisdictions that undermines
equality before the law and often allows perpetrators to evade justice.”).
69
Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)).
70
Deer, supra note 13, at 461.
71
See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (“Each of the States or Territories listed in the following table
shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian
country listed . . . to the same extent that such State or Territory has jurisdiction over
offenses committed elsewhere within the State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such
State or Territory shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they
have elsewhere within the State of Territory . . . .”).
72
Deer, supra note 13, at 460–61.
73
Indian Alcohol and Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-570, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207-146 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006 & Supp. IV
2011)).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Deer, supra note 13, at 461.
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disrespects tribal sovereignty in a very blatant way: “[t]he message sent by
this law is that, in practice, tribal justice systems are only equipped to
handle less serious crimes. As a result of this limitation on their custodial
sentencing powers, some tribal courts are less likely to prosecute serious
crimes, such as sexual violence.”77 When combined with Public Law 280
and the Major Crimes Act, the ICRA is a practical divestiture of all tribal
jurisdiction over major crimes committed by American Indians or Alaska
Natives in Indian Country.78
The Supreme Court recognized the federal government’s de facto
exclusive jurisdiction over major crimes in Oliphant v. Suquamish, when it
noted that “the issue of exclusive jurisdiction over major crimes was
mooted for all practical purposes by the passage of the Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968 which limits the punishment that can be imposed by Indian
tribal courts to a term of 6 months or a fine of $500.”79 As seen in the case
of Ronnie Tom,80 even if a federal prosecutor declines to prosecute a major
crime and a tribal court seeks to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction by
prosecuting that tribal member for the crime, the ICRA constrains the tribal
court’s power to punish the tribal member.
Oliphant also dealt a blow to tribal criminal jurisdiction over
defendants who are not American Indian and not tribal members. Mark
David Oliphant’s case came to the Supreme Court through a writ of habeas
corpus.81 The tribal court of the Suquamish Indian reservation in
Washington convicted Oliphant of assaulting a tribal officer and resisting
arrest.82 Oliphant argued that, as a non-Indian permanent resident of the
reservation, he was not subject to tribal criminal jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court, relying on the ICRA, agreed with Oliphant and stripped tribal courts
of the right to try non-Native offenders who violate tribal or federal law in
Indian Country.83
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AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 29.
Deer, supra note 13, at 461.
79
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203 n.14 (1978).
80
Riley, supra note 1.
81
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.
82
See id.
83
Id. at 195 n.6. It should be noted that although tribal courts have no criminal
jurisdiction over non-American Indian non-tribal members, tribal courts do have authority
over American Indians on their reservation who are not members of their tribe. This
includes American Indians from a different tribe, and American Indians from the tribe who
are not enrolled as official members. See U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004) (upholding
Congress’s amendment to the ICRA, 25 U.S.C § 1301(2) (2006), known as the “Duro fix,”
which authorized criminal jurisdiction over “all Indians”). See generally Duro v. Reina, 495
U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that tribal authority did not extend to American Indians not
78
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The prevalence of non-Indian and American Indian and Alaska Native
crime occurring in Indian Country has long been recognized as a public
safety concern.84 Legislation and common law suggest that the federal
government and the Supreme Court consider federal or state law as the
most appropriate deterrent to these crimes, federal or state law enforcement
as the best option for policing the reservations, and federal or state courts as
the most appropriate forum to prosecute criminals terrorizing Indian
Country.85 However, as Figure 1 illustrates, a criminal jurisdictional system
dependent on so many moving parts, such as the race of the perpetrator and
the location and severity of the crime, is unnecessarily complex.
Figure 1
The Jurisdictional Maze86
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belonging to the tribe), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511,
§ 8077, 104 Stat. 1856, 1892–93 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006)).
84
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212 (“[W]e are not unaware of the prevalence of non-Indian
crime on today’s reservations . . . .”).
85
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006 & Supp. IV
2011); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006); Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191.
86
This flowchart illustrates how the Major Crimes Act, Public Law 280, the Indian Civil
Rights Act, Oliphant v. Suquamish, and the “Duro fix” combine to determine jurisdiction
over crimes occurring inside or outside Indian Country, and committed by or against
American Indian and Alaska Native residents of Indian Country.
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Section C explains why the federal government and Supreme Court are
misguided and illustrates some of the practical problems arising from the
confused system existing before the Tribal Law and Order Act. Section C
shows how, when so many police agencies, prosecutors, and courts are
responsible for ensuring safety and order and facilitating victims’ search for
justice, there is often no justice for American Indian and Alaska Native
victims of rape and sexual assault.
C. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE PRE-TRIBAL LAW AND
ORDER ACT SYSTEM: AN EXPLANATION OF WHY THERE IS NO
JUSTICE

The main barriers to justice for American Indian and Alaska Native
women rape victims are inadequate policing, impediments to prosecution,
and jurisdictional confusion.87 American Indian and Alaska Native women
often encounter a police force not adequately trained to deal with sexual
assault and rape crimes; they face delays and failed law enforcement
responses, inappropriate police responses to allegations, and difficulty
obtaining forensics examinations such as rape kits.88
These problems stem in part from the jurisdictional confusion created
by federal legislation and the Oliphant decision.89 After a rape, an
American Indian or Alaska Native woman first has to contact tribal
authorities, who then must figure out which agency is responsible for the
investigation, contact that agency, and wait for the agency to travel to
Indian Country to conduct the investigation.90 This is a process that can
take months because of the lack of a dedicated force of either federal or
state police to investigate crimes in Indian Country.91 “Investigative
resources are spread so thin that federal agents are forced to focus only on
the highest-priority felonies while letting the investigation of some serious
crime languish for years. Long delays in investigations without arrest leave
. . . sexual assault victims vulnerable or suspects free to commit other
crimes . . . .”92
Inadequate investigation undoubtedly leads to difficulties in
prosecution. If an American Indian or Alaska Native woman’s case gets to
the prosecution stage, there are numerous obstacles affecting the possible

87
88
89
90
91
92

See generally AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18.
Id. at 41–46.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
Riley, supra note 1.
See id.
Id.
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prosecuting bodies. Tribal, state, and federal courts face their own unique
problems in prosecuting cases of rape that occurred in Indian Country.
In addition, tribal courts are constrained by the ICRA’s custodial
incarceration limits.93 Tribal courts also suffer from a lack of federal
funding, out-of-date tribal codes,94 and a lack of resources to revamp those
codes.95 Additionally, an expectation that federal prosecutors will pursue
all serious matters discourages tribes from making the necessary
investments to improve their courts.96 These issues make prosecuting
perpetrators of rape, sexual assault, and all other major crimes difficult for
tribal courts.
On the federal level, the largest impediment to a victim’s justice is a
federal prosecutor exercising his or her discretion to decline to prosecute a
case.97 Former United States Attorney Margaret Chiara admitted that some
federal prosecutors actively avoid prosecuting rape cases from Indian
Country: “I’ve had [Assistant U.S. Attorneys] look right at me and say, ‘I
did not sign up for this’ . . . they want to do big drug cases, white-collar
crime and conspiracy.”98 Chiara notes that most federal judges have similar
feelings: “They will look at these Indian Country cases and say, ‘What is
this doing here? I could have stayed in state court if I wanted this stuff.’”99
Other prosecutors fault poor investigation and lack of forensic
evidence for the large number of American Indian and Alaska Native rape
cases that prosecutors decline to prosecute each year.100 James A.
McDevitt, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Washington,101
explained, “We have the obligation before proceeding to a grand jury to
make sure we have a prosecutable case. . . . We’re not in the business of

93
Indian Alcohol and Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-570, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207-146 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006 & Supp. IV
2011)) (originally limiting punishment to one year of incarceration, a $5,000 fine, or both;
now limiting punishment to three years of incarceration, a $5,000 fine, or both); see also
discussion of ICRA supra Part II.B.
94
For example, the statute governing the Standing Rock reservation in North and South
Dakota does not include digital penetration as a form of rape. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note
18, at 64.
95
Id. at 63.
96
Id.
97
See Riley, supra note 1.
98
Bill Moyers Journal (PBS television broadcast Nov. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Bill Moyers
Journal]
(transcript
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/11142008/
transcript2.html).
99
Riley, supra note 1.
100
Bill Moyers Journal, supra note 98.
101
The case of Ronnie Tom falls in this district; however, McDevitt could only comment
generally, and not on the declination of Tom’s case. Riley, supra note 1.
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taking cases we’re going to lose.”102 Whatever the reason, federal
prosecutors decline to prosecute rape cases from Indian Country 65% of the
time.103 Because of federal jurisdiction requirements, rape is not a crime
generally prosecuted in federal courts.104 Therefore, comparisons between
the rate of declination to prosecute for rapes from Indian Country and rapes
from the general population are not easily made. However, in 2000, federal
prosecutors declined to prosecute about 26% of the cases filed in federal
court,105 a figure substantially lower than the 65% rate of declination to
prosecute rapes from Indian Country.
Barriers to justice similar to those present in federal and tribal courts
exist in state court as well. The most prominent difficulties in prosecutions
are discrimination and cultural barriers.106 The distance of the court from
remote Indian Country locations can also be a burden for an American
Indian or Alaska Native woman seeking justice for her rape.107
Another problem that faces all jurisdictions is one of bringing
perpetrators in to face prosecution. Perpetrators sometimes escape
prosecution by fleeing to a different jurisdiction.108 Because jurisdictions
are rigidly separated into state, federal, or tribal land, perpetrators can easily
cross borders to escape prosecution. Perpetrators are able to take advantage
of the jurisdictional lines unless federal, state, and tribal agencies enter into
extradition agreements.109 For example, in non-public law states a state
police officer has no jurisdiction to arrest a tribal member on tribal lands for
a crime committed outside of Indian Country.110 This means that a member
of the Navajo reservation can commit a crime in Albuquerque and return to
the reservation to be safe from New Mexico state police, unless there is an
extradition arrangement between the tribe and the state police.
Once in state or federal court, American Indian and Alaska Native
women face still more difficulty securing justice. When their cases are tried
in federal or state courts, American Indian and Alaska Native women often
face language and cultural barriers, discrimination, and inadequate jury

102

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
104
Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A
Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 765 n.2 (1986).
105
Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An
Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1445 (2004).
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AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 69–70.
107
Id. at 69. For example, in the public law state of Alaska, “cases are prosecuted in
state courts far away from the villages,” id., often involving an expensive plane ride.
108
Id. at 39.
109
Id.
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Id.
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representation.111 Often, there is also a hardship in traveling long distances
to secure a rape kit or communicate with a prosecutor in preparation for
trial.112
The sheer number of sexual assaults and rapes, combined with
jurisdictional confusion, inadequate policing, and barriers to prosecution,
put American Indian and Alaska Native women in a vulnerable position.
Their position prompted President Obama’s assertion that the current
situation amounts to an “assault on our national conscience” and “an affront
to our shared humanity.”113 President Obama stressed that “it is something
that we cannot allow to continue.”114
American Indian and Alaska Native women are raped more often and
more violently than any other group of women in the United States.115
Historically, the rape of American Indian and Alaska Native women was
used as a tool of war.116 Presently, these women continue to be raped by
white men and strangers, a shocking phenomenon considering that the
majority of rapes are intraracial.117 Despite the disproportionally high rape
rate, American Indian and Alaska Native women face barriers to justice.
Tribal courts have been stripped of their power to prosecute these crimes,
and federal and state officials often drop the ball on investigation, follow
through, and prosecution of rapes and sexual assaults in Indian Country.118
Furthermore, women whose cases do reach the prosecution stage are met
with the burden of traveling long distances to participate in the trial, and
face cultural and language barriers with prosecutors.119 With all of the
problems facing American Indian and Alaska Native women, the need for
an aggressive, proactive solution has been apparent for years. Part III
discusses the Tribal Law and Order Act, and the Act’s attempt to remedy
the problems outlined in Part II.
III. THE SOLUTION?
The Senate passed the Tribal Law and Order Act in June of 2010,120
the House followed suit, and President Obama signed the Act into law on
111

Id. at 69–70.
Id. at 71.
113
Toensing, supra note 22.
114
Id. (quoting President Obama as he spoke about the rape and sexual violence crisis in
Indian Country).
115
AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 2–4.
116
Deer, supra note 13, at 455.
117
AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 8.
118
Deer, supra note 13, at 457–60.
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AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 39.
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Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2261, 2261 (2010).
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July 29, 2010, with much popular support.121 Most tribal governments and
politicians applauded the Tribal Law and Order Act as “historic,”122 a
“monumental change,”123 and a “recognition of the tremendous criminal
justice gap faced by Indian country citizens.”124
The Act was celebrated as one that “will give American Indian nations
more authority to fight crime on their lands.”125 It has also been described
as “a groundbreaking piece of bipartisan legislation that tackles the complex
jurisdictional maze that allows violent crime against Native American and
Alaska Native peoples to flourish.”126 This Part will outline the major
changes introduced by the Act in Section A, and then, in Section B, will
look at the effect those changes will likely have on the lives of American
Indian and Alaska Native women.
A. THE CHANGES

The Tribal Law and Order Act first acknowledges that “the United
States has distinct legal, treaty, and trust obligations to provide for the
public safety of Indian Country.”127 The Act seeks to rectify the outlined
problems by clarifying the responsibilities of federal, state, tribal, and local
governments; increasing coordination amongst agencies; empowering tribal
governments; reducing the prevalence of violent crime in Indian Country;
combating sexual and domestic violence; preventing drug trafficking and
reducing the rate of alcohol abuse on reservations; and increasing and
standardizing the collection of criminal data between federal, state, and
tribal officials.128
The Tribal Law and Order Act is organized into seven subtitles, each
of which addresses one of its stated goals. Subtitle A addresses federal
accountability and coordination; Subtitle B discusses state accountability
and coordination for public law states; Subtitle C outlines provisions and
steps for empowering tribal law enforcement agencies and governments;
Subtitle D addresses tribal justice systems; Subtitle E references Indian
Country crime data collection and information sharing; and finally Subtitle
121

Toensing, supra note 22.
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Id. (quoting Walter Lamar, citizen of the Blackfeet Nation of Montana and president
and CEO of Lamar Associates, which offers consulting services in areas of law enforcement
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F relates to domestic violence and sexual assault prosecution and
prevention.129 The changes to the current law effected by these subtitles are
outlined below.
Subtitle A, dealing with federal accountability and coordination with
other agencies, attempts to clarify the jurisdictional maze that exists
between federal and tribal authorities in non-public law states by
summarizing the jurisdictional system governing major crimes in Indian
Country.130 Subtitle A makes four major changes to the current system of
federal jurisdiction over crimes in Indian Country. First, it requires the
appointment of special prosecutors to assist in prosecuting federal offenses
committed in Indian Country.131 The second major change requires the
appointment of at least one Assistant United States Attorney to serve as a
tribal liaison for districts that include Indian Country.132 The newly
appointed tribal liaisons will be responsible for coordinating prosecutions,
developing relationships between the federal government and tribal leaders,
providing technical assistance and training to tribal justice officers, and
conducting other activities deemed appropriate by the United States
Attorney.133 Third, Subtitle A requires the establishment of the Department
of Tribal Justice to serve as a point of contact between tribal governments
and the federal government for questions on DOJ policies and programs. 134
Lastly, Subtitle A establishes a new position, the Native American Issues
Coordinator, in the DOJ Executive Office for United States Attorneys to
coordinate prosecutions in Indian Country.135
Subtitle B is relevant to public law states and amends Public Law 280
to allow tribes to request concurrent jurisdiction between federal and state
courts136 over major crimes. It also allows tribes to submit applications for
three-way concurrent jurisdiction between federal, state, and tribal courts.137
Subtitle B stipulates that all changes to jurisdiction achieved through
Subtitle B must come “[a]t the request of an Indian tribe, and after
consultation with and consent by the Attorney General.”138 Further,
Subtitle B encourages state, tribal, and local governments to cooperate
129

§§ 201–266.
§§ 211–214.
131
§ 213(a)(1)(A).
132
§ 213(b).
133
§ 213(b).
134
§ 214(a).
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§ 214(b).
136
Public Law 280 gave exclusive jurisdiction to state courts. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006);
28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006).
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138
Id.
130

516

JASMINE OWENS

[Vol. 102

through “mutual aid, hot pursuit of suspects, and cross-deputization”
agreements by offering federal assistance to the parties to such
agreements.139 Federal assistance is available to tribes and state agencies
regardless of whether the tribe opts for concurrent federal jurisdiction, but
some form of cooperative agreement with a state or local agency is
required.140
Subtitle C outlines provisions and steps for empowering tribal law
enforcement agencies and tribal governments to assist federal agencies. It
delineates an agreement between the federal government and tribes to set
training requirements for tribal police officers.141 The goal is to set
minimum training requirements and give trained individuals the status and
authority of “Federal law enforcement officer[s].”142
Subtitles D (Tribal Justice Systems) and E (Indian Country Crime Data
Collection and Information Sharing) implement major procedural changes
and establish community programs.143 Subtitle D extends the federal
budget to include programs for alcohol abuse, mental health services, and
Indian education programs (including youth summer camps).144 Subtitle D
also funds legal representation in tribal courts, finances constructing and
improving tribal jails, and encourages the appointment and use of probation
officers.145 Subtitle E sets up much-needed procedures to track crimes
committed in Indian Country and aims to improve the recording of criminal
histories of repeat offenders.146 Currently, Indian Country crime data is
blended with federal or state crime data as well as with the Bureau of Indian
Affairs; this arrangement presents difficulties in studying problems,
recognizing trends, and tracking progress.147 The new system will track a
perpetrator’s offenses in federal, state, and tribal jurisdictions and also
mandates reports to be filed with the federal government that exclusively
track crime in Indian Country.148
Subtitle F deals specifically with prosecuting and preventing domestic
violence and sexual assault. The subtitle creates procedures for prisoner
release and reentry into Indian Country,149 trains Indian Country law
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

§ 222.
Id.
§ 231(b)(1).
§ 231(b)(1).
§§ 241–247, 251–252.
§§ 241–247.
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§§ 251–252.
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§ 261.
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enforcement to properly investigate domestic and sexual violence,150
defines procedures for coordination of federal agencies,151 establishes a
sexual assault protocol,152 and commits the Comptroller General of the
United States to conduct a study of the capabilities of Indian Health Service
facilities in remote Indian reservations and Alaska Native villages.153
Finally, Subtitle G, the last of the Act, establishes the Indian Law
Enforcement Foundation, sets out qualifications and compensation for those
serving on the board of directors, and dedicates up to $500,000 of federal
funding to fund the new organization.154 Most important for present
purposes, the Act amends the ICRA by increasing the maximum custodial
sentence that tribal courts can apply from one year of incarceration, a
$5,000 fine, or both to three years of incarceration, a fine up to $15,000, or
both.155
The seven subtitles of the Tribal Law and Order Act make major
changes to the current system. Section B discusses how changes instituted
by the Tribal Law and Order Act may affect future American Indian and
Alaska Native rape victims.
B. PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THE CHANGES

Some constructive provisions contained in the Tribal Law and Order
Act deserve the overwhelming praise and recognition that accompanied the
Act’s adoption. The attention to the problems faced by American Indian
and Alaska Native rape victims and the public awareness that comes from a
piece of national legislation have the potential to create serious change.
The effort to train tribal law enforcement156 and the implementation of
summer and other educational programs for youth living in Indian
Country157 will greatly improve the quality of life for American Indian and

150
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§ 265.
§ 266.
§ 231(c).
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Alaska Native communities. Finally, data sharing amongst agencies158 and
the increased training of tribal law enforcement (especially in the
specialized area of rape and sexual assault investigations)159 will make life
safer for those living in American Indian and Alaska Native communities.
Practically, American Indian and Alaska Native women are most
likely to be directly affected by three areas impacted by the legislation:
prevention, policing, and prosecution. American Indian and Alaska Native
women will notice and benefit from preventative measures and the
improvement of policing and prosecution because these are the areas that
rape victims deal with before and after their assaults. Under the Act, when
rapes occur, American Indian and Alaska Native women can expect only
slightly increased prosecution of their cases, but they will receive more
thorough investigation and medical care.
Preventative measures most likely will not deter those who rape
American Indian and Alaska Native women because the prevention
education is aimed at American Indian and Alaska Native men, who
commit a small portion of these rapes perpetrated each year. However,
increased public awareness and public disdain for the behavior of raping
American Indian and Alaska Native women may have some effect and aid
in preventing the cycle of non-Native men raping Native women.
With the projected training and increased cooperation between the law
enforcement agencies, American Indian and Alaska Native women can
most likely expect more thorough and professional investigations into their
allegations of rape and sexual assault. Women can expect more formalized
and predictable investigations, including access to rape kits at medical
facilities. With better investigations, it is likely that fewer cases will be
denied based on a purported lack of evidence. However, the legislation
does not provide for extra manpower on rural reservations. Therefore,
many crimes will continue to go uninvestigated.
The Tribal Law and Order Act’s empowerment of federal agencies
does not make sense. The Tribal Law and Order Act gives even more
investigative power to the federal government, which, as shown through the
current problems, has ignored its duty to American Indian and Alaska
Native women.160 The Act does expand the federal resources available to
prosecute Indian Country crimes. However, this is not the first time that the
federal government has pledged more resources to tribes. In 2002, the
federal government dedicated more agents and resources to policing Indian
Country, but redirected those resources to Homeland Security after the
158
159
160
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September 11th attacks.161 Giving more power to the entity that has
committed a gross dereliction of its duties year after year for more than a
hundred years defies logic, especially given that, historically, extra federal
personnel have been dedicated to Indian Country, then later redirected.
On the front of prosecution, American Indian and Alaska Native
women face a tough road despite the Tribal Law and Order Act. The Act
does nothing to fix or clarify the jurisdictional maze. “Jurisdictional
distinctions based on the race or ethnicity of the accused . . . have the effect
in many cases of depriving victims of access to justice”162 and will most
likely continue to do the same under the Tribal Law and Order Act. The
Act simply adds another layer of jurisdictional confusion by allowing
public law states to opt in to concurrent state, federal, and (possibly) tribal
jurisdiction.163 Subtitle B makes it an option for three different jurisdictions
to be concurrently responsible for the crimes occurring in Indian Country.164
Adding another layer exacerbates the confusion and will result in less
accountability for agencies. The jurisdictional system is already overly
complex. Subtitle B, by giving concurrent jurisdiction to federal courts
over public law states,165 further complicates the matter. While seeking to
clarify the jurisdictional maze, the federal government has added more
confusion by forcing victims to make the determination of whether federal,
state, or tribal authorities have jurisdiction, rather than just a determination
between two jurisdictions.
The Tribal Law and Order Act also creates even more bureaucracy
through new agencies and new officers, and therefore it adds to the
jurisdictional maze that already causes problems and confusion amongst
organizations and, worse, amongst American Indian and Alaska Native
victims of rape and sexual assault. Although adding more personnel is
arguably a step in the right direction, it does nothing to clear up the
confusion of who should act and when. Instead of simplifying the roles of
agencies involved, the Tribal Law and Order Act seeks to solve the problem
with more people.
We have already seen how, in the words of journalist Michael Riley,
“a system with overlapping opportunities for intervention can also fail
multiple times.”166 But the Tribal Law and Order Act compounds this
problem, rather than diminishing it. More people, with no consequential
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mechanism for increased accountability, will not improve the justice system
available to American Indian and Alaska Native rape victims.
The legislation also fails to meaningfully address the federal
prosecutors’ declination rate for prosecuting rapes of American Indian and
Alaska Native women. With increased training and more thorough
investigations, it seems to be Congress’s hope that fewer cases will be
dismissed, and therefore more rapists and other perpetrators will be brought
to justice. However, the legislation does not and arguably cannot combat
federal prosecutors refusing to prosecute rapes and sexual assault from
Indian Country because they “didn’t sign up for this” or would prefer
higher profile cases.
Although the introduction of a dedicated Assistant United States
Attorney will likely have some effect on prosecutions, American Indian and
Alaska Native women will most likely still be deprived of justice due to the
declination of prosecution by United States Attorneys. The Act simply
requires those United States Attorneys to give notice of their decisions not
to prosecute and offers no incentive or plan to guarantee more prosecutions
or valid declinations. Increased resources and attention focused on the
problems of prosecuting rapes in Indian Country may compel more zealous
prosecution by federal and state actors, but it is not the best solution. Tribes
still maintain the greatest interest in prosecuting these cases. A piece of
legislation cannot ensure vigor of prosecution, and in the case of the Tribal
Law and Order Act, it does not even attempt to curtail prosecutors from
declining to prosecute low-profile cases discriminatorily.
The Tribal Law and Order Act will have little impact on the lives of American Indian
and Alaska Native rape victims in the areas of prevention, policing, and prosecution.
Scholars studying the issues have noted that the [United States] government has
interfered with the ability of tribal justice systems to respond to crimes of sexual
violence by underfunding tribal justice systems, prohibiting tribal courts from trying
non-Indian suspects and limiting the custodial sentences which tribal courts can
167
impose for any one offence.

The Tribal Law and Order Act offers more of the same interference. More
hoops, less sovereignty, and more headaches from its imposed bureaucracy
constitute the real effects of the Act’s provisions empowering the federal
government.
The legislation falls far short of achieving its stated goals. Even if the
legislation is considered merely a step in the right direction towards
achieving these goals, the Tribal Law and Order Act takes several missteps
towards solving the problems facing American Indian and Alaska Native

167

AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 6–8.

2012]

“HISTORIC” IN A BAD WAY

521

rape victims and arguably is going in the wrong direction from the desired
end result.
IV. SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE LEGISLATION
The legislation fails in its general approach to the problems facing
American Indian and Alaska Native rape victims and the tribal governments
that seek to protect them. It also fails to address serious problems in the
system. The Tribal Law and Order Act does not seek to meaningfully
empower tribal authorities and does not respect tribal sovereignty, despite
the fact that the Act states these goals and the idea of empowering tribes to
handle justice has long been espoused as ideal.168 In 1995, Attorney
General Janet Reno acknowledged the importance of empowering tribal
judicial systems:
While the federal government has a significant responsibility for law enforcement in
much of Indian country, tribal justice systems are ultimately the most appropriate
institutions for maintaining order in tribal communities. They are local institutions,
closest to the people they serve. With adequate resources and training, they are most
capable of crime prevention and peace keeping. Fulfilling the federal government’s
trust responsibility to Indian nations means not only adequate federal law enforcement
169
in Indian country, but enhancement in tribal justice systems as well.

In a general sense, the legislation is inherently flawed in that it seeks to
solve the problem by placing more control with federal and state
governments.170
Additionally and more specifically, the Tribal Law and Order Act does
little to make the situation better for American Indian and Alaska Native
victims of rape and sexual assault. For example, Subtitle B is basically a
game of choose-your-own-conqueror for tribal authorities: tribes in public
law states are given the choice between allowing the state to maintain
jurisdiction or giving jurisdiction to a federal government that has long
neglected its duties to American Indian and Alaska Native rape victims.
There is no provision for tribes to elect for exclusive jurisdiction; the choice
provided is between partnering with state authorities, federal authorities, or
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“[One] purpose[] of this title [is] . . . to empower tribal governments with the
authority, resources, and information necessary to safely and effectively provide public
safety in Indian country . . . .” Tribal Law and Order Act, § 202(b)(3).
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Janet Reno, A Federal Commitment to Tribal Justice Systems, 79 JUDICATURE 113,
114 (1995), available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/articles/reno.htm (footnote omitted).
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See, e.g., Tribal Law and Order Act, §§ 211, 213–214, 221–222 (authorizing federal
jurisdiction in public law states); § 234(a) (increasing the custodial sentencing cap to three
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concurrent federal and tribal jurisdiction in non-public law states).
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both. It’s not a very meaningful choice, and it is insulting to tribal
sovereignty to offer this as a solution to the problem of serious crimes going
unpunished in Indian Country. In giving more power to “outside”
authorities rather than vesting it back in tribal authorities, the legislation
blatantly disrespects tribal sovereignty and therefore builds no bridges for
increased cooperation (another enumerated goal of the legislation).171
In light of expected continuing problems, the federal government
should adopt further changes to the Tribal Law and Order Act that will
move towards bringing justice to American Indian and Alaska Native rape
victims. The most beneficial modifications to the Act would be to adopt
concurrent jurisdiction over American Indian and Alaska Native
perpetrators, remove custodial sentencing caps to allow tribes to punish
their members, and provide federal funding for tribes to further develop and
update their judicial systems.
Adopting concurrent jurisdiction between federal and tribal authorities
for major crimes, such as rape, committed by tribal members and
concurrent jurisdiction with either federal or state authorities (not both) in
public law states would recognize tribal sovereignty and empower tribes to
take action to protect American Indian and Alaska Native women. With
this concurrent jurisdiction, it is also necessary to remove the limits on
tribal courts’ ability to punish their own members proportionally for their
crimes, and to fund the judicial system appropriately.
Adopting these three changes would avoid all too common
occurrences of tribal offenders getting off as easily as Ronnie Tom just
because a federal prosecutor declined to try the case. Restoring tribal
authority to prosecute and punish for serious crimes could greatly affect the
prevention, policing, and prosecution of rapes and sexual assaults in Indian
Country, but would also serve the higher purpose of mending relationships
between federal and tribal authorities and would facilitate cooperation to
combat sexual violence and other crimes.
It is important to remember that the rape of American Indian and
Alaska Native women is not a new phenomenon, but that “the United States
was founded, in part, through the use of sexual violence as a tool, that were
it not for the widespread rape of Native American women, many of our
towns, countries, and states might not exist . . . . Thus, critical to
contemporary anti-rape dialogues is the inclusion of historical analysis of
colonization”172 and an attempt to heal this relationship.
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The federal government has a responsibility to ensure that women are
able to enjoy their right to freedom from sexual violence throughout the
United States—including in Indian Country.173 The federal government has
promised to protect American Indian and Alaska Native women,174 but
tribal authorities also share this interest and should, therefore, be allowed to
share in the responsibility. “As citizens of particular tribal nations, the
welfare and safety of American Indian and Alaska Native women are
directly linked to the authority and capacity of their nations to address such
violence,”175 in part because of the failures of the federal government and in
part because tribal authorities are better suited to deal with rape and sexual
assault.176
The biggest issue is that American Indian and Alaska Native women
suffer the highest rate of sexual assault in the United States—a form of
violence that was once used as a weapon of war and colonization against
them. Stripping contemporary tribal governments of the ability to prosecute
many sex offenders and to defend their citizens disrespects tribal
sovereignty and assigns American Indian and Alaska Native women a
second-class status.177 The legacy of historic abuses persists under the nose
of the federal government, and American Indian and Alaska Native women
continue to suffer and to be dehumanized as they have been throughout
U.S. history.178 This history of rape and sexual violence informs presentday attitudes, of our government and of perpetrators, that help fuel the high
rates of sexual violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women
and the high levels of impunity enjoyed by their attackers.179
Removing sentencing caps will do nothing to solve the problem of
punishing non-Native individuals convicted of rape and sexual violence
perpetrated in Indian Country against tribe members (which is, admittedly,
a majority of the offenses perpetrated against American Indian and Alaska
Native women). This Act, if amended to eliminate caps, would restore a
level of sovereignty and respect to tribal jurisdictions. “For tribal
governments, defining and adjudicating crimes such as sexual assault can

173
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See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); Tribal Law and Order Act.
175
AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 1.
176
Id. at 30 (“Tribal courts are the most appropriate forums for adjudicating cases that
arise on tribal land, and . . . state and federal authorities often do not prosecute those cases of
sexual violence that arise on tribal land and fall within their exclusive jurisdiction.”).
177
Deer, supra note 13, at 455.
178
See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 17.
179
Id.

524

JASMINE OWENS

[Vol. 102

be the purest exercise of sovereignty. What crime, other than murder,
strikes at the hearts of its citizens more deeply than rape?”180
In a history that has been plagued first by conquest, then by trickery,
and now by paternalism, returning the power to punish would go a long
way in building partnership and trust.
V. CONCLUSION
The Tribal Law and Order Act was written with American Indian and
Alaska Native victims in mind. Therefore, the most important perspective
in analyzing the legislation’s effectiveness is the victim’s. If the Act had
been in effect in 2003 when Ronnie Tom attempted to rape a twelve-yearold and did rape a seven-year-old, what would be different for the victims?
The answer, sadly, is not much.
The legislation cannot force police and prosecutors to care about the
abuses and hardships faced by American Indian and Alaska Native women
because the Act cannot create an interest where one does not exist. The
new legislation would produce little to no practical difference: Tom would
serve up to six years181 instead of two.
The only way to achieve justice, fairness, and consistent outcomes is
to put more trust in tribal governments, and to allow those with an interest
to make headway against the dire situation of American Indian and Alaska
Native women. Tribal courts are the most appropriate forum to try cases
against American Indian and Alaska Native perpetrators and they should be
empowered to do so with concurrent jurisdiction and authority to impose
sentences proportional to the crime.
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Deer, supra note 13, at 465.
Ronnie Tom received two years based on stacked sentences of one year for each
crime: the range reflects the maximum Tom would receive (two three-year sentences) and
the minimum he would likely receive (one three-year sentence). 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
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